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Questioning the Global Scaling Up of Low-fee Private Schooling: the nexus 
between business, philanthropy and PPPs 
 
Prachi Srivastava 
 
 
1. The LFP Sector: The Second-Wave 
 
In view of generally accepted claims of poor state sector quality in many countries of the 
Global South, the low-fee private sector has often been posited as ‘the poor’s best 
chance’ (Tooley, 2000) against broader concerns of the state’s fundamental duty to 
provide basic education to all (Watkins, 2004). The initial emergence of the low-fee 
private sector and its subsequent evolution into an attractive sector for business backed 
by domestic and international corporate investment, holds an important and divisive 
place as we enter the post-2015 era in global education.  
 
As I have discussed elsewhere (Srivastava, 2013), at the beginning of the international 
Education for All (EFA) movement, the emergence of the low-fee private sector was 
dismissed in high-level policy circles, and by academics and right to education 
advocates as an atomised phenomenon, fragmented and insufficient in scope to warrant 
concerted study. This was in view of more pressing EFA goals to ensure, quite rightly, 
that all children are able to access free basic education. However, what first seemed like 
small, disconnected, individual schools ‘mushrooming’ in specific contexts where there 
was little or poor quality state provision, has taken root as a phenomenon, purportedly 
of scale, backed by corporate actors, particularly in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Asia. 
 
This has attracted widespread attention as part of a broader trend of privatisation of 
and in education, and quite unlike dismissals of the past, has reached the highest levels 
of global education policy-makers, influencers, and advocates. For example, the UNESCO 
Education for All Global Monitoring Report began including a section on low-fee private 
schooling since the 2009 report. Global civil society actors such as the Right to 
Education Project, the Soros Open Society Foundations, and the Global Initiative for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have been spurred into developing a human rights 
framework for private sector engagement in education. The most vehement criticism 
has come from the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education who 
has referred to the existence of corporate-backed schools and providers in education as 
being indicative of ‘abusive practices’ (United Nations, 2014) of the private sector, 
calling on states to sanction them:  
 
89. By definition, business is profit-oriented. Education is all the more attractive 
since it denotes a certain respectability, which can be projected to disguise business 
interests, fraudulent practices and corruption […]  
90. As regulators, States must sanction abusive practices by private education 
establishments (United Nations, 2014) 
 
Given the earlier dismissive response of the academic and global policy community, the 
urgency expressed to examine the potential centrality of the sector as inimical to 
equitable access to education for all in just a decade, is remarkable. In essence, we are 
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entering a ‘second-wave’ in our understandings and analyses of the low-fee private 
sector; as is the sector, of its evolution.  
 
I argue that the second wave sees a shift from ‘one-off mom-and-pop teaching shops’ in 
schooling micro-ecosystems (e.g. individual villages, slum communities, and urban 
neighbourhoods), to their coexistence with corporate-backed school chains and service 
providers. These chains operate as part of a micro-system within themselves across 
geographical boundaries beyond the local (e.g. across districts, cities, regions, and 
countries). The entry of ‘big’ corporate capital, both domestic and international, and the 
emergence of an ecosystem of allied service providers for this sector (e.g. education 
microfinance institutions; rating systems; scripted curriculum delivery systems; 
education technology providers (low- and high-tech), etc.), many of which are also 
corporate-backed or run, are markers of institutional evolution (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Thus, though the scale and reach of the low-fee private sector may not be as 
grand and wide as the operators purport, the second wave is strongly entrenched 
within increased corporate engagement, business practice, and commercialisation. And 
this warrants serious attention. 
 
The second wave seems comprised of at least three intertwining and enabling trends, 
resulting in the emergence of corporate-backed low-fee private school chains and 
service providers in the Global South. Of these, this chapter will focus on the first two, in 
the main: 
 
(1) Mobilizing discourse and filtering evidence — in particular, morphing the 
metaphor of the market to illogical consequence 
 
(2) The opening up of domestic formal education spaces through state-sanctioned 
public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements, and framing mental models 
accepting of the discourse of ‘partnership’ 
 
(3) Increasingly opaque, intertwined, and complex sets of ‘new/non-traditional’ 
non-state private actors operating in education in the Global South, with direct 
or arm’s length corporate connections that operate by blurring the lines between 
‘doing business’, profit-making, and ‘doing good’ (Olmedo, 2013) 
 
These arguments are posited against three caveats. Firstly, claims of ‘scale’ purported 
by the corporate-backed low-fee private sector should not be taken at face value. In fact, 
when we examine the reach and numbers of some of the most publicised chains, we find 
the total numbers to be miniscule as a proportion of state provision. 
 
Secondly, the corporate-backed low-fee private sector does not operate equally across 
all areas of the Global South. As a concerted business venture with desired results on 
investment, we see the emergence of this second wave primarily in middle-income 
countries with significant ‘buzz’ around the engine of economic growth. India, with its 
relatively stable political climate and as one of the top five largest world economies, is a 
favoured location.  
 
Finally, the act of ‘doing good’ may be broadly termed ‘philanthropic’, but is of a nature 
quite different from traditional non-profit grant-making philanthropies in the ‘business 
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of charity’. Many of the non-state actors (e.g. venture philanthropies, social 
entrepreneurship firms, corporate social responsibility units, etc.) involved with the 
diffusion of corporate-backed low-fee private school chains and their allied service 
providers operate with mental models framed by and the modalities of the ‘business of 
making money’ with an added offshoot of ‘doing good’. This is similar to Ball and 
Olmedo’s (2011) characterisation of ‘creative capitalism’, or ‘an approach where 
governments, businesses, and nonprofits work together to stretch the reach of market 
forces so that more people can make a profit, or gain recognition, doing work that eases 
the world’s inequities’ (Microsoft, 2008 qtd. in Ball & Olmedo, 2011, p. 84). 
 
 
2. Morphing the Metaphor of the Market and Filtering Evidence 
 
The emergence of the second wave of the evolution of the low-fee private sector and its 
research is linked to strong enabling discourse that ‘morphs’ (Cowen, 2009) the 
metaphor of the market and filters evidence. A number of recent reviews raise queries 
about the low-fee private sector, and point to inconclusive evidence on relative 
achievement, inputs, and affordability (see Day et al., 2014; Mcloughlin, 2013; 
Srivastava, 2013). Overlooked work includes that of influential low-fee private sector 
advocate and investor, James Tooley, and his colleagues’ own scholarly and refereed 
published research which is technical in tone and, when closely read, reveals important 
nuances.  
 
On relative achievement, their work in Kenya and India showed that private school 
students did not universally achieve better results in every subject, taking account of 
background variables (Dixon et al., 2013; Tooley et al., 2010). On equity concerns, their 
work in Nigeria and India showed that the most disadvantaged, described as orphans, 
migrants, and financially unstable families, could not afford the ‘low’ fees charged 
(Tooley & Dixon, 2005b). Finally, their work revealed education corruption at the 
highest levels, showing that such schools in India gained recognition through bribery 
(Tooley & Dixon, 2005a). These findings are similar to results of other studies in 
contexts including Ghana, India, Nigeria, Malawi, and Pakistan, among others (e.g. 
Akaguri, 2011; Chudgar & Quin, 2012; Fennell & Malik, 2012; Härmä, 2009; 2011; 
Ohara, 2013; Rose, 2005; Rose & Adelabu, 2007; Srivastava, 2007; 2008).  
 
Despite much contrary research evidence, including that from his own work, Tooley’s 
‘catchy’ journalistic commentary, grey and informal reports, and book on his ‘personal 
journey’ into the ‘education of the poor’ (Tooley, 2009) have been highly publicised. 
This work has caught the attention of high-level policy circles and networks of non-state 
private actors. Nambissan and Ball’s (2010) detailed analysis suggests that this is a 
result of Tooley and his network’s ‘policy entrepreneurship’ ‘par excellence’ on school 
choice and the low-fee private sector in deep and far-reaching transnational networks.  
 
Recommendations include establishing public and private voucher schemes, education 
service companies for school improvement and accreditation, education 
microcredit/loan companies, and ‘the liberalisation of the regulatory environment 
regarding private…schools making a surplus’ (Tooley & Dixon, 2003, p. 22), 
acknowledging that this may, in fact, be illegal. These have inspired many second-wave 
low-fee private sector players to act. Examples referring to Tooley’s work in particular, 
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include India’s Centre for Civil Society advocating state-subsidised vouchers to access 
low-fee private schools; Gray Matters India creating a school performance system for 
‘affordable private schools’; co-founder of Omega Schools, Ken Donkoh to start a chain 
in Ghana (eventually in collaboration with Tooley); IDP Foundation’s Rising Schools 
Program, a micro-credit initiative for the sector in Ghana.  
 
The decided enthusiasm about the low-fee sector is not based in sentiment alone. It is 
imbibed with the motivation to actively create a global market for the corporate-backed 
low-fee private sector. This is helped by extending the metaphor of the market and the 
reach of its ‘Three Musketeers’ — branding, competition, and profit: ‘Assisting the 
market in the creation of educational brand names…is another possible area for outside 
action—for philanthropy, investment, and aid if required to satisfy investors of the 
viability of the market’ (Tooley, 2009, p. 260).  
 
The potential for investors to capitalise on establishing branded chains and services to 
the sector, with a focus on replication and standardisation, is key. Tooley asserts, ‘school 
chains with names such as EasyLearn or Virgin Opportunity could be as reliable as, say, 
Sainsbury’s or Boots’ (Wilby, 2013). Bridge International Academies, purportedly the 
world’s largest chain of low-fee nursery and primary schools, bills itself as ‘the 
Starbucks’ of schools in developing countries (Olopade, 2013).   
 
In this idealised market, ‘competition would be a chief spur’ (Tooley, 2009, p. 261). 
Unbranded or unchained schools ‘could suffer or go out of business’ (Tooley, 2009, p. 
261), or others could ‘soon enter the market establishing competing brand names’ (p. 
261). There is little consideration for what would happen to children in instances where 
they are attending schools that close and others do not step in to fill the gap.  
 
The profitability of low-fee private schools even as relatively small, single operations by 
individuals without the backing of ‘big’ capital, was noted early on: ‘running a school 
even for low-income families was potentially a profitable undertaking, with estimated 
profits of about 25% in the year of [school] recognition’ (Tooley & Dixon, 2003, p. 19). 
The profitability of scaling up the sector did not go unnoticed. In 2012, Pearson, owner 
of the Financial Times, and the world’s largest educational publisher, launched the 
Pearson Affordable Learning Fund (PALF), a $15 million fund to invest in the low-fee 
private sector across Asia and Africa (Tran, 2012). PALF has quite possibly, and with 
speed, become the most influential player in supporting the scaling up of the corporate-
backed low-fee private sector. ‘In January 2015 we [PALF] announced Pearson will 
invest a further $50 million over the next 3 years’ (PALF, 2015, website). Michael 
Barber, PALF’s Chief Education Advisor, and reportedly ‘an old friend’ of Tooley’s 
(Wilby, 2013), stated in an interview on BBC HardTalk: ‘It’s absolutely for profit. But get 
this right—it’s important to demonstrate profit because we want other investors to 
come in (Barber qtd. in. Riep, 2014, p. 264). As Riep (2014) notes, in the early attempts 
to create a market in this sector, demonstrating profitability is key to attracting 
investment.   
 
For those with interests in the corporate-backed low-fee sector and for advocates of 
increased private provision, the impetus to draw big capital into the fold is a welcome 
development. Acknowledged state sector dysfunctions in many countries are proposed 
as the impetus to expand the low-fee private sector, rather than actively injecting capital 
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to improve the state sector. For example, Michael Barber asserts: ‘The question every 
education leader needs to answer is: 'How do we get every child in this district, city, 
state, province or country a good education as soon as possible?' Low-cost private 
education is an important part of the answer, in almost every country in the developing 
world’ (PALF, website, 2015). 
 
However, the current discourse framing the development of the low-fee private sector 
morphs the metaphor of the market to such degree that there is little consideration of 
whether the claim to a fundamental right and the provision of a social good to the 
economically and socially disadvantaged are really comparable to middle-class 
supermarkets, pharmacies, and coffee shops. Even Milton Friedman, the revered 
champion of the marketization of education, conceded the role of the state in ensuring 
basic education for all. He noted two peculiarities of education as a good, which add to 
the complications of treating markets in education as pure competitive markets.  
 
The first was related to what he termed, ‘neighbourhood effects’. These are 
‘circumstances under which the action of one individual imposes significant costs on 
other individuals for which it is not feasible to make him[/her] compensate them, or 
yields significant gains to other individuals for which it is not feasible to make them 
compensate him [/her]’ (Friedman, 1962, pp. 85-86). In other words, education has 
social consequences beyond the individual. The effect, for example, of choices made by 
one group of parents at a specific point in time that lead to school closures can have 
resounding effects for other children in the present, and for future children. This can 
lead to deleterious effects on society. 
 
The second was termed as the ‘paternalistic concern for children and other 
irresponsible individuals’ (Friedman, 1962, p. 86). There is the need for the state to be 
involved in education (particularly in developing countries) where schooling may not 
be universal, making it compulsory to some minimal level, and enforcing that 
compulsion to uphold children’s right to education. In addition, there may be equity 
concerns regarding mechanisms that disproportionately benefit relatively advantaged 
groups.  
 
Nonetheless, the corporate-backed expansion of the second-wave of the low-fee private 
sector, sometimes with the financial support of bilateral agencies and multilateral 
development banks exists (e.g.  Bridge International Academies). This is despite 
inconclusive evidence and amidst calls against profiteering and, in certain cases, is in 
contravention of legal frameworks. Bridge International Academies, which receives 
funding from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the CDC (the UK’s development finance 
institution), openly admits it: ‘Technically, we're breaking the law’, as stated by Chief 
Strategy Officer Shannon May in an interview with the Times Education Supplement 
(Exley, 2013).  
 
The primary strategy for keeping costs ‘low’ across the sector is the common practice of 
hiring teachers at below the minimum wage, or in most cases, certainly below the 
teacher’s state salary scale (e.g. India, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, etc.). This is against 
labour laws. There are laws against the commercialisation of schools and running 
schools for a profit (e.g. India). There are additional concerns that such operators may 
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receive undue taxation benefit and in the acquisition of land at much below market 
rates in certain contexts (e.g. Pakistan; India). Despite this, the scaling up of the 
corporate-backed sector is enabled by the tacit and willing involvement of government 
and international agencies through the mental models and modalities of partnership.  
 
 
3. Scaling Up: Tacit ‘Partnerships’ and PPP Modalities  
 
The involvement of certain non-state private actors, corporate actors, in particular, may 
be more immediately explained by a commercial motive. However, scaling up the 
corporate-backed low-fee private sector is many times tacitly, but also explicitly, 
enabled by national governments and supported by bilateral and multilateral agencies, 
most recently, under the modalities of PPPs and the discourse of ‘partnership’. 
 
The argument here resists the idea that the second wave of the low-fee private sector 
naturally evolved as the result of default due to state sector dysfunction. While areas of 
consensus between sympathisers and critics of the low-fee sector are few, as the first 
wave of low-fee private sector studies emerged, both groups seemed to initially agree 
that spontaneous, ‘de-facto privatization’ of education emerged because of state failure 
(Tooley & Dixon, 2006); a response that ‘grew by default rather than design’ (Rose, 
2003, p. 80). I contend that there has been inadequate provision of state schooling in 
many contexts but, privatisation (or slices of privatisation), which may once have been a 
default strategy, is becoming the strategy of design. This is specifically the case with PPP 
modalities, which in particular, have enabled the evolution of the second wave of the 
low-fee private sector, keeping the centrality of partnership discourse in mind. 
 
Partnership constitutes the education buzzword du jour. Cornwall (2007) explains: 
‘buzzwords gain their purchase and power through their vague and euphemistic 
qualities, their capacity to embrace a multitude of possible meanings, and their 
normative resonance’ (p. 472). Their ability to signify what is en vogue is ensconced 
within a logic of taken-for-grantedness and can ‘cloud meanings…through a language of 
evasion’ (Cornwall, 2010, p. 3). Currently, ‘partnership’ is as ‘ubiquitous as community, 
evoking much the same warm mutuality’ (Cornwall, 2007, p. 475). But, it is precisely its 
ubiquity that renders ‘partnership’ ‘a floating empty signifier’ (Burgos, 2004).  
 
In an attempt to more radically define the term, Pickard (2007) suggests that: 
‘partnership denotes a special relationship between equal participants, or yes, partners, 
who enjoy a distinctive bond of trust, a shared analysis of existing conditions in society, 
and thus in general a common orientation of what needs to be done to construct a more 
just, equitable, and democratic world’ (p. 575, emphasis added). However, the social 
justice ideal mentioned above is conspicuously missing from most discussions in favour 
of the vagaries of partnership as ‘a universal – almost a neutral – value upon which all 
specific agents and governments in general, would agree’ (Burgos, 2004, p. 58).  
 
I argue that the seemingly convivial mutuality of the term ‘partnership’ obscures the 
fundamentally altered mode of governance under PPP modalities, particularly with the 
introduction of new/non-traditional (and for-profit) non-state private actors in 
education. While the partnership discourse normatively neutralises the involvement of 
profit-motivated actors in particular, state-sanctioned PPP modalities may insert them 
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in complex, opaque, and intertwined arrangements, in which the motivations of 
individual actors may not resonate. Despite this, the notion of mutuality persists.  
This notion of mutuality enables PPP modalities to be legitimised in spite of lessons 
from countries with longer histories of PPP-friendly institutional frameworks that 
large-scale PPP arrangements are riskier for the public sector as there are fewer actors 
to bear the risk, but also that they operate with vested interests against those of the 
public’s, can lead to more complicated regulatory frameworks not less, and that they 
have the potential of becoming ‘abusive’ if the stronger partner dominates (Coulson 
2005; van Marrewijk et al., 2008).  
 
India, Pakistan, and Uganda are examples of countries that have instituted PPP 
arrangements relatively recently for non-state actors (including, in some cases, private 
entrepreneurs or ‘edupreneurs’, corporates, and international organisations) to take 
over the management, operation, and establishment of schools. Words such as ‘nurture’, 
‘encourage’, and ‘facilitate’ are repeatedly used in government documents to outline 
desired action regarding PPPs and the involvement of non-state actors. These 
arrangements and the accompanying discourse fuel evolution of the second wave of the 
low-fee private sector by design, not default. 
 
In 2007, Uganda’s Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) adopted a PPP policy to 
universalise secondary education. In the MOES vision, PPPs are positioned as vehicles 
through which quality education can be achieved (MOES, no date, section ‘The 
Department's Mission and Vision’). A PPP programme has been launched with the aim 
of: ‘Identifying private schools to partner with government in implementing USE 
[universal secondary education]’ (MOES, no date, section ‘Programmes’). This has 
enabled external non-state actors to set up schools in Uganda and apply for state 
funding.  
 
 
In Pakistan, the Sindh Education Foundation launched the ‘Promoting Private Schooling 
in Rural Sindh Project’ in 2008, designed in collaboration with the World Bank. The 
scheme aims to support 1000 new private schools in underserved areas in 10 districts 
(Sindh Education Foundation, no date, p. 7). ‘Entrepreneurs’ are invited to establish 
lower-fee private schools in rural areas but are barred from charging tuition fees to 
students. Schools are meant to receive a subsidy of Rs. 350/month/boy and Rs. 
450/month/girl enrolled. This model is predated by the Punjab Education Foundation’s 
Foundation Assisted School programme which runs along similar lines (Punjab 
Education Foundation, 2014).1 Recently, the All Private School Management Association 
appealed to the government to view low-fee schools in Sindh outside the scheme as 
necessary partners in expanding education access. It asked for government grants to 
fund these private schools to ‘salvage their crumbling’ finances (The International 
News, 2014), as they were unsustainable without them.  
 
My analysis of India’s Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Five Year Development Plans 
showed that the broader macro-planning process successively facilitated PPPs in 
education, and decreased the role for the state in education financing, management, and 
                                                             
1
 The Sindh Education Foundation and the Punjab Education Foundation were established by the government 
as semi-autonomous and autonomous institutions, respectively. 
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regulation (Srivastava 2010; Srivastava et al., 2013). Verger and Vanderkaaij (2012) 
provide a compelling analysis in the Indian context of the use of PPPs as political 
instruments of ‘reform’. This is despite the limited role officially accorded to the private 
sector in the Government of India’s Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Education for All) 
programme, which focused on expanding state provision since 2000. Under an 
unspecified ‘PPP mode’, the PPP discourse has been sufficiently broadened to allow a 
range of actors with different motives to enter the schooling space. This has included 
opening up the sector to private companies under their philanthropic arms to start/run 
low-fee private schools, including a host of international non-state actors. 
 
Positioning low-fee private schools as PPP initiatives is a notable shift in policy 
discourse and practice, which should not go amiss. In the countries cited above, 
traditional models that could be likened to public-private arrangements before the term 
was en vogue did not include the possibility of corporations or individual 
‘entrepreneurs’ running schools, or schools running for a profit. Instead, these were 
usually community-run, or run by a charity, religious order, or trust (e.g. private-aided 
schools, madrasas, missionary schools, etc.) under very different regulatory 
environments and compulsions.  
 
In the first wave of research on the low-fee private sector, the language of PPPs was 
neither used to describe low-fee private schools, nor were such schools thus 
conceptualised. Conversely, until very recently, none of the research on low-fee private 
schools (including Tooley’s) positioned them as PPPs. It focused instead on their for-
profit or unregulated/unrecognised nature which fell outside the regulatory framework 
of most countries. In essence, the ‘PPP creep’ in the low-fee private sector normalises 
and encourages the expansion of a sector that, until recently, was seen as usurping state 
regulation, and in certain contexts, still does. 
 
 
4. Scaling Up (?) 
 
As is apparent from the discussion thus far, evidence of initiatives on the second wave 
of the sector is nascent. Available information is fragmented and opaque, and 
concentrated in a small range of countries in the Global South, and on a relatively small 
number of actors. This makes it difficult to map the evolution of the sector, its size, and 
to draw broad conclusions. Nonetheless, a few notable examples are presented here. For 
the purposes of this discussion, and given its influence, we focus on PALF, specifically on 
its portfolio of education chains (Table 1).  
 
 Country Sector Stated Scale Published Fees Estimated Fees as 
Proportion of Min 
Wage/ Unskilled 
Wage* 
Organisational 
Links
+
 
Type of Linked 
Actor
+
 
APEC 
Schools 
Philippines Secondary 13 schools
x Grade 7:  
P 24,850/yr 
Grade 8:  
P 25,350/yr 
Grades 9-12: N/A 
Grade 7 & 8: 15%  
 
Grades 9-12: N/A 
but likely higher 
 Ayala Corporation 
 PALF 
Corporate group 
(holding company) 
Avanti 
Learning 
Centres 
India Secondary 
private 
tuition 
12 centres 
 
[5 stand-
alone 
centres; 7 in-
school 
Unclear N/A  Echoing Green 
 Draper Richards 
Foundation 
 Pan IIT Alumni 
 UnLtd India 
-Social 
enterprise/impact 
investment 
-Not-for-profit 
-Personal 
investors 
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centres 
(Chennai and 
Tibetan 
schools)] 
 PALF 
 Personal 
investors 
Bridge 
International 
Academies 
Kenya 
(Uganda, 
Nigeria for 
expansion) 
Elementary 359 schools; 
+100,000 
students 
~$5/month 8% 
(As proportion of 
stated target group: 
families living on 
maximum $2/day) 
 Bill Gates 
 CDC  
 DFID 
 IFC 
 Khosla Ventures  
 Learn Capital  
 NEA  
 Novastar 
 Omidyar 
Network  
 PanAfrican 
Investment Co. 
 Rethink 
Education 
 PALF 
-Venture capital 
and private 
investment firms 
-Bilateral aid 
agency 
-Bilateral donor 
bank 
-Personal 
investors 
Lekki 
Peninsula 
Affordable 
Schools 
Nigeria Elementary N/A N/A N/A  Unclear 
 PALF 
Unclear 
Omega 
Schools 
Ghana Elementary 38 schools; 
20,000 
students 
~$0.65/day 41%  Personal 
investors 
 PALF 
-Personal 
investors 
Spark 
Schools 
South 
Africa 
Elementary 5 schools 
(+ 1 for 
expansion) 
R 17,955/yr 62%  eAdvance 
 ISASA 
 PALF 
-Education 
management 
company 
-Private schools 
association 
Sudiksha 
Knowledge 
Solutions 
India Pre-school 23 pre-
schools 
N/A N/A  ~Unclear 
(Franchise 
model) 
 PALF 
-Private investors 
Table 1 Pearson Affordable Learning Fund (PALF) Portfolio of Chains 
Source: All data extracted from PALF and organisational websites. Last verified March 2015. 
Note: * Calculated in the currency used by the provider. Latest lowest wage rates were used. South Africa (farming and agriculture, 
March 1 2014- 29 February 2015); Philippines (mean of four groups, 2015); Ghana (local daily wage rate, 1 May 2014- 30 May 
2015); Kenya (lowest wage 2014-2015). Monthly rate calculated on 30 working days, and on the basis of one full-time adult worker. 
+The organisational links may not be exhaustive, as not all data may be publicly available. Some websites were more developed than 
others.  
X: A news report states that APEC plans to expand by adding 11 new schools by the end of 2015. 
 
According to Pearson’s earlier website, it ‘makes minority equity investments in for 
profit companies to meet a growing demand for affordable education services’ (Pearson 
PLC, 2012, para 1). As mentioned above, as of January 2015, Pearson announced a 
further $50 million investment in addition to its initial $12 million over the next three 
years. According to PALF, ‘This is a testament to Pearson’s commitment to educate 
children in the developing world and brings our total assets under management to $80 
m[illion].’  
 
PALF has a portfolio of 10 investments in what it calls ‘affordable education services’, 
more specifically, in chains and ancillary service providers. Of these, six are school 
chains from pre-school to secondary, and one is a chain of private tuition centres 
focusing on secondary school exam preparation. The remaining three are investments 
in education technology and learning materials.2 Geographically, four of the investments 
                                                             
2
 These are Zaya (India) ‘“LabKit” solution [which] includes ClassCloud, an adaptive learning platform that can 
store and deliver digital content in both online and offline environments’ and ‘End-to-end solution that 
includes tablets pre-loaded with curriculum content, a classroom projector, a Wifi router, content storage, 
teacher training, and a classroom management tool’; Experifun (India) providing science experiments and 
Copy-edited proof to appear in: A. Verger, C. Lubienski, & G. Steiner-Khamsi (Eds.) (2016). The global 
education industry—World yearbook of education 2016. New York: Routledge. 
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are in India, and the rest are spread out in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines, South 
Africa, and Tanzania. Crucially, what constitutes ‘affordable learning’ for PALF is neither 
precisely defined, nor consistently applied, as a cursory look at the fees charged by its 
chain operators reveals.  
 
Of these, Omega Schools and Bridge Academies International are best known. In 2008, 
while a student, Ken Donkoh, a native of Ghana, and previously an employee of the 
World Bank and IFC approached Tooley with a business plan (Riep, 2014). As relayed 
by Donkoh and Tooley to me in personal communications, Omega started with the 
investment of personal capital, until PALF took a stake in Omega Schools in 2013. This 
allowed the chain to expand to 38 schools and reportedly to 20,000 students. In 2013, 
Tooley predicted 100 schools with 50,000 students by 2014 (Wilby, 2013). This does 
not seemed to have materialised at the time of writing, and may point to the potential 
limits of scalability. 
 
As of June 2012, Pearson is reported to have invested in Bridge. Its ‘Academy-in-a-Box’ 
approach is marketed as having ‘re-engineered the entire lifecycle of basic education, 
leveraging data, technology, and scale’ to keep quality up and prices low (Bridge 
International Academies, 2013a). From its first academy in 2009 in Kenya, Bridge had 
359 schools in 2014, and plans to expand to Uganda and Nigeria in 2015. According to 
the Omidyar Network, one of its investors, Bridge plans to operate in at least 12 
countries across Sub-Saharan African and India, and have more than 10 million students 
by 2023 (Omidyar Network, no date).  
 
Though it is premature to make definitive claims based on available information, we 
can, nonetheless make a number of initial observations. Firstly, it is clear that chain 
operators are linked to a number of various kinds of actors, included an expanded array 
of new/non-traditional non-state private actors, sometimes alongside government, not-
for-profit, and aid agencies in complex arrangements. The relationship between the 
actors is opaque, their roles, and their influence on the chain operator is unclear. In 
many instances they are sets of investors, but not always (e.g. SPARK schools). While 
Bridge, the largest operator, also has the largest and most diversified sources of funding, 
this is not true of Omega, the second largest. Much more concerted analysis is required 
to make sense of the links, and to ascertain whether or to what degree each operator 
would be part of a network.  
 
Secondly, claims of scale are over-zealous. It is unclear if this is a marketing ploy by 
chain operators to inspire confidence in attracting PALF and other investors; mobilizing 
discourse by PALF to gain global legitimacy; or plain naiveté and misplaced optimism. 
Simple observation reveals that with the exception of Bridge, the actual number of 
schools/centres for each operator is quite small. They constitute a miniscule proportion 
of total provision in these countries, as well as a miniscule proportion of public 
provision. Simple calculations would reveal these to be much below 1%.3 Even in 
Bridge’s case, coverage would constitute approximately 1.8% as a proportion of public 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
learning materials; and Ubongo (Tanzania) ‘a social enterprise that creates interactive edutainment for 
learners in Africa’ geared to teaching math through ‘edutoons’ on television.  
3
 Estimates for Sudiksha and Avanti are difficult to provide as public data on the number of registered private 
tuition centres and pre-primary centres are unavailable. 
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provision in Kenya with 19,397 public primary schools, and less if this included the total 
number of primary schools.4 
 
Thirdly, published fee rates were difficult to obtain publicly. Only APEC, Bridge, Omega, 
and Spark published their fees. In the case of APEC, only rates for the first two years 
(Grade 7 and 8) were available, even though the schools run until Grade 12. Based on 
APEC’s increasing fee structure between Grade 7 and 8 it would be reasonable to 
assume that this continues until the end of the cycle. Finally, other than in Omega’s case, 
it was unclear if the fees charged represented the total out-of-pocket costs households 
would need to pay. SPARK provided a breakdown of tuition, stationery, and registration 
fees, but though the uniform and meal plan were mentioned, costs were not available.  
  
Finally, all operators frequently used terms such as ‘affordability’, ‘disadvantaged’, and 
‘bottom of the pyramid’ on their promotional websites. The analysis here shows that 
this can be severely questioned by: (a) the paucity of information and lack of 
transparency on the fee structure and fee amounts; (b) any specific operationalisation 
of what is meant by ‘affordable’; and (c) estimates showing published fees as a 
proportion of local daily/minimum wage rates.  
 
There is no universally agreed figure on what constitutes ‘affordable’ expenditure on 
education. Estimates here are provided as a general rule of thumb, and a more detailed 
cost analysis and comparisons with costs of accessing public providers would need to 
be conducted.5 However, as the bulk of literature on household education expenditure 
confirms, families in the bottom quintile are highly sensitive to income and other 
insecurities (i.e., health, food price shocks, seasonal migration, etc.), and are unlikely to 
be able to access fee-paying providers for any sustained period. It would be hard to 
argue that Omega Schools and SPARK, in particular, whose costs amount to 41% and 
62% as a proportion of local daily/minimum wage rates per child would be affordable to 
this group, even if estimates included more two full-time adult workers. 
 
This raises serious questions about how and on what basis PALF judges affordability 
and invests in school chains; and further, how chain operators raise money in the name 
of reaching disadvantaged children in the Global South. This analysis assumes urgency 
where public monies in such initiatives are directly invested by bilateral agencies, or 
where domestic governments subsidise such providers in PPP arrangements either 
through their own funds or through direct budgetary support offered via official 
development assistance. We must seriously question whether the expanded array of 
new/non-traditional non-state private actors in complex arrangements with non-profit, 
government, and international donors facilitated by PPP arrangements can lend itself to 
the potential capture of those spaces by actors engaged in creative capitalism who are in 
the ‘business of making money’, without necessarily doing the ‘good’ they purport.  
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